Cutting losses? Assad, Syria, and Russia’s strategic flexibility

Russian troops accompany a convoy of Syrian civilians leaving the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Hasakeh province via the strategic M4 highway, on January 10, 2021. (Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images)

The collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, and Russia’s decision to stand-by and allow it to occur, has been held up by some in the West as indicative of Moscow’s imperial overstretch and declining regional influence. The Kremlin’s ongoing “special military operation” in Ukraine is clearly straining Russia’s military, the thinking goes, so much so that it could not stem the rolling rebel tide and was unable and unwilling to prop up the regime any further.

As attractive as this narrative is, Western analysts should be wary of putting too much emphasis on the idea that Russia was unable to help and not enough on the simple fact that it was unwilling. It’s more likely that Vladimir Putin saw Russia’s support for Assad for what it was: a relatively low-cost, high-impact arrangement that, as rebels advanced, outlived its usefulness.

Strategy is fundamentally about trade-offs, and here it appears that Moscow made a clear decision: The benefit of continuing to support the Assad regime was not worth the cost. To read further weakness into it could mean underestimating the Russian bear.

To be clear, the fall of Bashar al-Assad is undoubtedly a setback for Moscow — one on which President Vladimir Putin was notably silent during a recent annual televised meeting with military leadership. Since the 2015 intervention, the Kremlin invested considerable financial resources and political capital on Assad’s behalf. But for this investment — comparatively small when assessed against, say, the resources America has poured into the region — it gained a foothold in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. Its naval bases in the country served as a refueling stop in the Med and a jumping off point for operations in Libya and further into Africa.

Those are valuable resources to be sure, but not ones Moscow was unwilling to let go if the cost of maintaining them became too high (especially if it can negotiate with the new power brokers in Syria to keep the bases).

Some were quick to point Ukraine’s impact on Russia’s operations in Syria, but this is to misunderstand Moscow’s footprint in the country. While important, it was rather limited to providing airpower and advisors, with some private military contractors, as opposed to a large ground component.

Would Russia have been more willing to counter the advance of the rebels were it not engaged in the special military operation? Possibly. It may have committed additional forces to defend the Assad regime. It is, however, equally possible that the regime reached a point at which further assistance was a losing proposition.

The speed with which the Assad regime collapsed reflected a decidedly weak operational and tactical situation. Any counteroffensive on behalf of the regime would have been prohibitively costly for Moscow. This would have run counter to a central organizing tenet of the operation in Syria — its comparative low cost and low casualty rate. Throughout the relationship the Assad regime also proved to be a fickle and difficult partner for the Kremlin, unwilling to engage with the opposition and attempting to balance between Russia and Iran (and one off the other).

The long-term disposition of Russia’s forces in Syria remains unknown. Early reporting suggests that Russian forces are repositioning from forward operating bases to Khmeimim airbase and the port of Tartous, and potentially evacuating from the country entirely — though for how long is unknown. The immediate impact of this is apparent as US officials report that anti-Islamic State operations have become easier due to the withdrawal of Russian air defense systems. Much remains contingent on how the relationship between the Kremlin and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham evolves.

The certain antipathy towards Russia for its brutality on behalf of the Assad regime, and for enabling its stay in power, will likely play some role in the evolving. Yet, there is no guarantee that Hayʼat Tahrir al-Sham will seek to permanently evict Russia’s forces from the country and may seek to turn Moscow from an opponent to merely a neutral actor. Much will depend on the actions of both the United States and Israel.

What message did the Kremlin’s inaction send to autocratic regimes in Africa, those propped up by Moscow’s private military companies and Russian influence campaigns? Arguably, it demonstrated that Moscow is willing to continue to support a regime so long as it is winning and able to retain power — and willing to heed the Kremlin’s advice. The point at which a regime is no longer able to do so, the Kremlin will make a strategic decision and change course.

It did not leave the Assad family to its fate, offering it a lifeline back to Moscow (and the family’s not inconsiderable properties) and ensuring it will escape international justice for the foreseeable future. What African autocrat wouldn’t wish for the same comparably graceful exit from power?

The fall of Assad is a setback for Russia, but also a reflection of the Kremlin’s strategic flexibility. Focusing solely on the former and missing the latter is to engage solely in wishful thinking, which risks strategic surprise both in Syria and in the Kremlin’s activities further afield.

Joshua C. Huminski is Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, a George Mason University National Security Institute Senior Fellow, and Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He can be found on Twitter @joshuachuminski.