Air Warfare

Polish elections should bring changes, but expect defense spending to mostly continue

Analysts predict that a new government will keep deals under contract going, but programs that aren't fully signed may see cuts or pivots towards European-made products.

Donald Tusk Convention In Katowice, Poland

Donald Tusk, the leader of Civic Platform opposition alliance, speaks during election convention in Katowice, Poland on October 12, 2023. Tusk is expected to be named Polish prime minister following election results. (Beata Zawrzel/NurPhoto via Getty Images)

WARSAW — In an election whose last months were dominated by national security issues, Polish voters appear to have tilted the ruling national-conservative Law and Justice (PiS) out of control of parliament, one which analysts largely expect to back the strong defense spending of recent years — with some potential changes to longer-term projects. Poll results from Sunday’s election show that PiS won the largest share of the vote, with 36.6 percent. But that margin will not be enough to overcome a joint coalition led by the centrist Civic Coalition (FO), which got 31.0 percent, the center-right Third Way (Trzecia Droga, 13.5 percent) and The Left (Lewica, 8.6 percent). The far-right Confederation (Konfederacja) got only 6.4 percent, a much lower result than previous polls suggested. “The main pillars of Poland’s defense policy enjoy wide support, despite deep political polarization,” Marek Świerczyński, head of security and international affairs desk at the Polityka Insight center for policy analysis based in Warsaw, told Breaking Defense. “There is no significant opposition voiced against the expansion in size [to 300,000 people and six divisions] and enhancement of capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces. Even in the recent, much heated, political campaign, the idea of Poland becoming a major military power remained unquestioned by rivaling parties.” The final results, which are expected to end with
former European Union president Donald Tusk returning as prime minister, came after PiS attempted to brand itself as the pro-military party for several years, only for that plan to backfire in their faces in the final days of the election. National security took on an outsized role in the run-up to the election, with PiS for several years leaning on defense spending as a way to rally nationalist sentiment. Announcements of the creation of new military units were permanent elements of the campaign, often without detailed plans about equipment and weapons those units would use. Poles noticed, with one poll for Fakty TVN and TVN24 television finding that 77 percent of those surveyed claim that the military should remain apolitical — and 56 percent feeling PiS used the military for campaign purposes. Almost one month ahead of elections, Poland’s Minister of National Defense Mariusz Błaszczak, has set off a security storm by publishing parts of a top-secret defense plan as part of a campaign spot aimed at discrediting the opposition. In a PiS
video posted on social media Sept. 17, Błaszczak claimed that “the [former Prime Minister] Tusk government was ready to give up half of the country in the event of a war.” His words were accompanied by images of what appeared to be excerpts from the plan and its cover, bearing the “top secret” mark, now crossed out. Publicizing some defense plan contents, even if they were old documents, led to a firestorm of
criticism from retired officers, with opposition politicians jumping on the issue. “War is not a picnic or a show, you have to know how to do it,” Mirosław Różański, a former General Commander of the Armed Forces and an opposition candidate to the upper chamber Senate, said. Meanwhile, PO spokesman Jan Grabiec accused Błaszczak of “betraying the Polish Army, uniformed services and the national interest, claiming his actions would have serious consequences.” In the heat of the moment, Civic Coalition even said if it wins the election, it will put Błaszczak under the Tribunal of State, a separate organ of the judiciary, to be held constitutionally accountable. (It remains to be seen if this was merely campaign rhetoric or if they will attempt to follow through.) If Błaszczak’s video sent shockwaves through the election, then a full-on tsunami hit just five days before the election, when two of Poland’s highest-rank officers – Gen. Rajmund Andrzejczak, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, and Lt. Gen. Tomasz Piotrowski, Operational Commander of the Polish Armed Forces – announced their resignation from their posts. According to a report in the daily Rzeczpospolita, the men resigned over protest due to a dispute with Błaszczak over the handling of the Russian Kh-55 missile that fell near Bydgoszcz in late 2022. Unsurprisingly, opposition politicians jumped on the situation. “The violent resignations of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Arm[ed Forces] and the Operational Commander are a shock for the army and a grim culmination of 8 years of PiS rule in the area of security,” Tomasz Siemoniak, a former defense minister from the opposition FO party,
wrote on social media. “Frantic appointments of new generals do not end this crisis, just as frantic purchases after February 2022 do not obscure the omissions in modernization after 2015,” he added. President Andrzej Duda appointed Gen. Wiesław Kukuła to become the Chief of General Staff and Maj. Gen. Maciej Klisz to become the Operational Commander of the Armed Forces. That could create an awkward situation under a new government, as both officers are seen as favorites of Błaszczak.

Defense Spending And Reorganization Impact

The question now is what changes may come on the defense side under a new government. Broadly speaking, “no major shift is expected, as Poland’s posture and plans are largely threat-driven. A neo-imperial policy of Putin and Russia remains a dominant security factor for Poland and the region,” said Świerczyński. “As a frontline country, with largest military, economic and demographic potential in the region, Poland declared it wanted to become a bulwark of defense and undertook long-term investment to do so.” Those comments were echoed by Tomasz Smura, director of research at the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, who told Breaking Defense, “I think there will be no major shift in Polish security and defense policy after the election, as we have political consensus among major parties in this regard. And yet, there may be changes around the edges, Smura predicted. “For Poland, NATO membership and the alliance with United States will remain [the] bedrock of defense policy, but one may expect more attention to security cooperation within European Union … One may also expect some change in command structure … there may be also some personal changes,” he said, specifically calling out the newly-appointed Kukuła as Chief of General Staff.
Mariusz Błaszczak poland

Polish minister of Defense, Mariusz Błaszczak speaks to the media during a live fire exercises during the multinational DEFENDER Europe 20 military exercises at the Drawsko Pomorskie training grounds on August 11, 2020 at Drawsko Pomorskie, Poland. (Photo by Omar Marques/Getty Images)

Under PiS, current plans are in place for defense spending to exceed zł113 billion ($27 billion), equivalent to 3 percent of next year’s planned GDP, according to the Poland’s Ministry of Finance’s 2024 draft budget — A 16.3 percent increase from 2023. Almost half of that amount (zł49.3 billion), would be allocated to capital expenses, including procurement of the new equipment and armament, and infrastructure investments, equivalent to 43.5 percent of the entire defense budget. Another $1.4 billion (which includes some money granted from the US) would be allocated to the procurement of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks, which are set to replace the T-72 tanks being transferred to Ukraine, to equip the 18th Mechanized Division. It is also expected that the additional zł40 billion will be financed through the Armed Forces Support Fund, a government-created pot of money stood up by PiS, to procure South Korean armament and equipment, including K2/K2PL main battle tanks, K9A1/K9PL self-propelled howitzers, K239 Chunmoo/Homar-K multiple rocket launchers and FA-50PL/FA-50 light combat aircraft. As a result, next year, Warsaw’s total defense expenditure would be close to 4.2 percent of GDP (in 2023 it was 3.9 percent of GDP). That’s a lot of money, and the kind of thing that may get more scrutiny, even from Tusk’s largely pro-defense centrist party. According to Świerczyński “any new government will need to audit public finances and may adjust defense spending. […] Poland’s public finances have been for years suffering for lack of transparency and cohesion, with a lot of extrabudgetary funding and rising debt. The right-wing government has only just begun consolidating public finances in [its] 2024 draft budget, which resulted in a spike of national debt to approximately 60 percent of GDP. “Since the budget bill has not yet been voted upon, the new parliament will have a say and there may be shifts in spending based on the new approach to public finances.”

Acquisition Contracts In Peril?

The global defense industry will be watching closely to see what happens to the billions and billions of dollars that PiS pledged to defense over the last several years. Anti-PIS leadership have promised to keep signed contracts valid, Świerczyński said, as they attempted to thread a political needle. “They have been cautious not to undermine PiS defense policy, because of the public support for it and some historic neglect on their side. While being critical a year ago, they have muted their objections and promised to keep those procurement contracts that have been signed.” “However, if the audit of public finances was to bring poor makings, some defense procurement might be delayed or cancelled. Of the big programs where numbers may be cut, attack helicopters, tanks and rocket artillery appear vulnerable, while submarines can be shelved altogether,” he predicted. Particularly at risk are programs that are operating under “framework agreements,” which is a key contracting tool used by PiS. While the party loved to announce giant buys of weapons, many of these only have small, legally-binding contracts actually signed. For instance, the Korean-made K2 tanks were announced as a total procurement of 1,000 vehicles, but only 180 have actually been put on contract, with 28 delivered this year. “There is also lack of clarity as to those capabilities that have been announced as ‘in progress’ but not yet procured – this applies mainly to FMS-based HIMARS and AH-64E. However, the US direction is least threatened due to strategic reasons,” Świerczyński said. The analyst also predicts that Poland under Tusk may look more towards European-made equipment. For instance, the FO party has already declared it wants Poland to join the European Sky Shield Initiative in air defense. “This will probably be a symbolic gesture of opening towards pan-European projects and will not affect Poland’s domestic plans for MRAD and SHORAD, which are based on Patriot/IBCS and CAMM solutions and already under contract,” Świerczyński said. “But a pro-European government will want to demonstrate openness to both France and Germany, possibly by joining some PESCO projects, placing a bid in MGCS and FCAS, as well as buying enabling platforms for aviation. If the Korean tank project is reduced for whatever reason, [the]  new government may return to Leopards,” as opposed to the PiS plan to buy more US-made Abrams tanks, he added. More broadly, he said to predict more debate in parliament about defense spending than was seen under PiS. One thing to watch for immediately, he stressed, is that FO declared it wanted to audit defense ministry contracts and promotions, which may bring some reporting documents available for the market and the public. “But the process may effectively halt new decisions for three to six months,” he added.