The USS Oregon (SSN 793) transits the Thames River after returning from routine operations in route to Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton, Conn., Oct. 14. The Virginia-class fast attack submarine USS Oregon and crew operate under Submarine Squadron (SUBRON) FOUR and its primary mission is to provide attack submarines that are ready, willing, and able to meet the unique challenges of undersea combat and deployed operations in unforgiving environments across the globe. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Wesley Towner)
This is the latest in a series of regular columns by Robbin Laird, where he will tackle current defense issues through the lens of more than 45 years of defense expertise in both the US and abroad. The goal of these columns: to look back at how questions and perspectives of the past should inform decisions being made today.
I have just returned from a five week visit to Australia and to Hawaii. During that visit, I had the chance to talk with US and Australian officers about the challenge of deterring the Chinese in the Pacific —not forgetting the other two nations threatening Western interests, namely the Russians and the North Koreans.
The salience of submarines to Australian deterrence and their contribution to allied deterrence was evident with the AUKUS announcement of the Australian government’s decision to acquire nuclear submarines to replace their aging diesel Collins-Class submarines.
In a presentation to the Williams Foundation, Vice Admiral Mead, the key ADF officer involved in working the submarine program with the United States and the United Kingdom, emphasized that his Navy had not done as good of a job explaining the impact of the submarine decision on Australia’s deterrence capabilities as they needed to do.
When I got to Hawaii, I had a chance to meet with Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon, the Submarine Force, US Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) commander who provided a robust discussion of the role of submarines in the evolving deterrent approach of the United States and its allies in the Pacific.
As he put it: “I would no longer characterize ourselves as a silent service. Deterrence is a major mission for the submarine force. You can’t have a credible deterrent without communicating your capabilities; if the adversary doesn’t know anything about that specific deterrent, it’s not a deterrent.”
To illustrate the importance of communicating these capabilities, Jablon told me that as we spoke, there were 18 submarines underway in the Pacific Ocean. Of these, seven were operating west of the international dateline.
It’s not hard to see ways in which the service is trying to create deterrence through signaling.
In recent years the Navy has begun demonstrating visibly its presence in various ways, such as SSBN port visits. At the same time as my visit to Pearl Harbor, the Navy had released photos of the ballistic missile submarine USS Maine (SSBN 741) visiting Guam, and a joint meeting of the leaders of the US and South Korea came with the announcement of future submarine port visits to the ROK Port visits and pursuing diverse locations from which to resupply the force are increasingly important, especially in times of conflict.
In addition, the Navy is stepping up its cooperation with allied and partner submarine forces, as illustrated by Jablon recently hosting the Submarine Warfare Commanders Conference. This was a core meeting with other submarine commanders from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. As he underscored: “During the conference, the submarine force commanders discussed the coalition approach to interoperability, which is a key part of deterrence.”
Jablon underscored that they were stepping up exercises with allies in common ASW and USW operations. For example, he mentioned a recent exercise with South Korea and Japan in working joint capabilities. It’s another example of how Chinese actions in the region are driving countries together in the Pacific and providing new opportunities for the US Navy to work with those allies.
Of course, there is the less-public — and more pointy — end of the deterrent stick. There are a number of ongoing developments that need to be highlighted to understand exactly how the US views its submarine force and its evolution.
It must be understood that the submarine force can operate separately or work with the joint force to provide joint force solutions. As the joint force works enhanced kill web capabilities, what Ed Timperlake and I have previously defined as ”combat clusters” can operate together to deliver joint fires or, in other words, very different types of platforms can come together to create a joint effect.
In addition, the submarine force is adding autonomous systems capabilities. Jablon specifically mentioned two. The first is the ability to operate a UUV out of a torpedo tube, with the UUV coming back after its mission to offload data specifically onboard the submarine. The second is the ability to launch a UAV from a submerged submarine to enable joint fires. He said that the submarine force has specifically worked with the USMC in their development of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) solution set.
Finally, the joint force, including the submarine force, are developing new ways to do expeditionary logistics to enable resupply of the force when operating in a contested environment. For food or critical parts, an Osprey has been tested to provide vertical replenishment. For weapons, the submarine tenders have been working to resupply submarines who operate from various bases in the region to conduct the rearm mission. Obviously, the command element would work submarine operations in such a way that a cascading approach to weapons resupply would be worked in times of conflict.
As Jablon concluded, “The submarine force is now becoming part of the ‘combat clusters’ that you’re talking about instead of an independent operator. In the Cold War, we operated independently, alone, and unafraid. During the land wars, we started becoming part of the joint force as we provided land fires via the TLAM. Now, we are fully integrated with the joint force in terms of targeting and communications. But, of course, we can also conduct independent operations as the ‘silent service’ when directed.”
So, a less silent service — but one that still recalls its core function